§1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Dano on 11 November 2014. 1 Its fi nding that a Member State is not precluded from excluding nationals of other Member States from entitlement to social assistance when they do not have a right to reside there raised two signifi cant questions. First, the concept of lawful residence -essential for the purposes of claiming a right to equal treatment with host state nationals -was tied fi rmly in this judgment to the conditions established by Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38. 2 But it was not clear whether an EU citizen residing lawfully on another basis -whether, for example, based on national law 3 or EU law 4 -could still ground a right to equal treatment in primary EU law (Articles 18 and 21 TFEU). Second, while the Court confi rmed that an individual assessment of the fi nancial circumstances of the claimant should be undertaken to establish as a question of fact whether or not he or she possessed suffi cient resources to satisfy the requirement of 'suffi cient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence' codifi ed in Article 7(1) (b) of the Directive, 5 a proportionality-driven assessment of the impact of exclusion from entitlement in each claimant's particular case was not required. 6 Might other 'categories' of claimants be therefore similarly and legitimately excluded from entitlement under national legislation or was the Dano rationale instead tied inherently to the interest of 'prevent [ing] economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's welfare system to fund their means of subsistence ', 7 noting that it was also established as a matter of fact by the referring court in that case that the claimant was 'not seeking employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work '? 8 Th e judgment in Dano provoked 'an unusual stir' 9 that questioned the intended scope of the Court's reasoning and the implications of its choices. 10 However, a clearer understanding of 'social assistance' -a crucial term used in several provisions of Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 80. 6 Contrary to the position in previous case law e.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493, para. 91-93. 7 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 76. 8 Ibid., para. 66. 9 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:210, para. 4. 10 For an overview of relevant interpretative possibilities, see H. Verschueren, 'Preventing benefi t tourism in the EU: a narrow or broad interpretation of the possibilities off ered by the ECJ in Dano? ', 52 Common Market Law Review (2015), p. 363. 910 23 MJ 6 (2016) Directive 2004/38 -was established, since the Court repeated the defi nition that it had recently provided in Brey, that is all assistance schemes established by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources suffi cient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public fi nances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State. 11 Importantly, the Court seemed to suggest that the exclusions from entitlement to social assistance provided for in Directive 2004/38 worked not just in parallel with but above the system developed for coordination of social security under Regulation 883/2004. 12 Additionally, in an earlier line of case law, it distinguished '[b]enefi ts of a fi nancial nature which, independently of their status under national law, are intended to facilitate access to the labour market'. 13 EU citizens seeking work in a host state could not be excluded from entitlement to this type of benefi t even though Article 24(2) of the Directive explicitly excluded them from entitlement to social assistance. However, the diff erence between both types of benefi t in substance had not been determined.
In a relatively short timeframe, the Court had the opportunity to add three further links to this particular 'judicial chain' 14 -Alimanovic, 15 Garcia-Nieto, 16 and Commission v. UK. 17 Fundamentally, questions about which EU citizens should be supported in host states, to what extent, and for how long are necessary to ask. As questions of policy, they have become fused with broader uncertainties about the worth of extending solidarity beyond state borders, and with broader debates on migration that are too oft en conducted in a toxic haze. As questions of law, they are less worked through than they need to be.
Refl ecting on the recent case law developments, this comment seeks primarily to contribute to debates about a concern for quality of law -the quality of EU citizenship 11 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 61, 63, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 61. See also, Recitals 10, 16 and 21 of the Preamble and Articles 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 24 of Directive 2004/38. 12 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 63-64: 'It must be stated fi rst of all that "special non-contributory cash benefi ts" as referred to in Article 70 (2) and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied and revised. It examines the implications of Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK for the diff erent kinds of citizen-claimants involved in each case -the fi ndings of which concern those looking for work, those who have worked previously but no longer do, and those who need to rely on Article 7(1)(b) to establish lawful residence in the host state. It also refl ects -somewhat less abstractly than might have been the case before the recent 'Brexit' shock and the European Council negotiations that preceded it -on the rules that apply to those who have moved to another state and are working or selfemployed there. Ironically, while the commitment to equal treatment for EU workers in host states undoubtedly infl uenced the permissive foundations of EU citizenship law, limits restraining the latter may now be feeding back to revised thinking about the former. §2. THE CASES A. ALIMANOVIC Ms Alimanovic and her three children are Swedish nationals, though the children were born in Germany in the 1990s. Th e family left Germany in 1999 but re-entered in 2010. For less than one year, that is from June 2010 until May 2011, Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter both worked in short-term positions. From 1 December 2011, when they were neither working nor self-employed, they received non-contributory subsistence benefi ts as benefi ciaries fi t for work under the applicable national rules; Ms Alimanovic also received non-contributory subsistence benefi ts for her two younger children. However, payment of all benefi ts was suspended aft er 31 May 2012. Th e referring court regarded Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter as jobseekers, meaning that their entitlement to subsistence benefi ts was precluded under the applicable national rules even though home state nationals would be entitled to the benefi ts in question in the same circumstances. 18 Advocate General Wathelet framed the legal problem raised by the case as sensitive in human and legal terms. It will necessarily lead to the Court ruling both on the protection off ered by EU law to its citizens, as regards their fi nancial situation and their dignity too, and on the current scope of the fundamental right to free movement, a founding principle on which the European Union is built. 19 Th e fi rst question concerned the nature of the benefi ts at issue. Neither the defi nition of social assistance nor its legal autonomy vis-à-vis Regulation 883/2004 as established in Brey and confi rmed in Dano had revealed whether or how the concept overlapped with 18 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 34 and 40. 19 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 2. 912 23 MJ 6 (2016) benefi ts 'intended to facilitate access to the labour market' -which fall outside the scope of the derogation from equal treatment prescribed by Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 and which must, in consequence, be granted to jobseekers from other Member States when granted to home state nationals as a matter of equal treatment. Th e Court adopted the reasoning of Advocate General Wathelet on this point, guiding the referring court towards examining the 'predominant function of the benefi ts at issue' -if that is found in fact to cover the minimum subsistence costs necessary to lead a life in keeping with human dignity [then] those benefi ts cannot be characterised as benefi ts of a fi nancial nature which are intended to facilitate access to the labour market of a Member State [but] must be regarded as 'social assistance' within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38. 20 Second, confi rming Dano, the Court reiterated that entitlement to social assistance on the premise of equal treatment requires that the claimant's 'residence in the territory of the host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 2004/38'. 21 On the facts of the present case, the Court examined whether Ms Alimanovic and/or her eldest daughter could establish residence on the basis of either Article 7(3) or Article 14(4)(b) of the Directive. Article 7(3) sets out when Union citizens who are no longer working or self-employed can retain that status and thereby claim lawful residence under Article 7(1) (a). But Article 7(3)(b) requires that the citizen has worked for more than one year, ruling out, just, its relevance for the claimants in this case. Article 7(3)(c) states that citizens who had worked for less than one year retain worker status for six months -precisely the point at which payment of subsistence benefi ts was suspended in this case.
Article 14(4)(b) provides that an expulsion measure may not be adopted against a Union citizen or their family members where the Union citizen entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged. 22 Th e Court confi rmed that Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter could establish a right to reside in Germany on that basis, and therefore come within the scope of equal treatment to social assistance in principle. 23 (2016) 913 that the host Member State may refuse to grant any social assistance to a Union citizen whose right of residence is based solely on that latter provision'. 24 Finally, the Court addressed the ambiguity remaining aft er Dano about when a host state should (or need not) undertake assessments of individual circumstances, fi nding that although the Court has held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure or fi nds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system (…) no such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings. 25 
B. GARCIA-NIETO
Th e key diff erences between Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto are that, in the latter case, the claimants were fi rst-time jobseekers and the disputed entitlement to non-contributory subsistence benefi ts concerned the fi rst three months of residence. Ms Garcia-Nieto is a Spanish national who moved to Germany with her daughter in April 2012. She registered as a jobseeker on 1 June and began work as a kitchen assistant soon aft erwards, receiving a salary from 1 July. Her partner, Mr Peña Cuevas, and his son arrived on 23 June, all four living initially with Ms Garcia-Nieto's mother. On 30 July, the family applied for subsistence benefi ts -these were granted with the exception of benefi ts for Mr Peña Cuevas and his son for August and September, neither of whom were 'family members' of Ms Garcia-Nieto within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive. 26 National rules excluded Mr Peña Cuevas from entitlement to the benefi ts on the basis that he had resided in Germany for less than three months and was neither a worker nor self-employed at that time.
Unsurprisingly, the Court repeated the main fi ndings from Alimanovic -here, lawful residence was connected to Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38 27 while, again, the explicit derogation from equal treatment was found in Article 24(2) ('the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence'). On the question of individual assessment, the Court remarked that 'if such an assessment is not necessary in the case of a citizen seeking employment who no longer has the status of "worker", the same applies a fortiori to persons who are in a situation 24 Ibid., para. 58.
25
Ibid., para. 59; citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 64, 69 and 78.
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Ms Garcia-Nieto and Mr Peña Cuevas were not married and therefore not 'spouses' as per Article 2(2); his son was not therefore the direct descendant of Ms Garcia-Nieto's spouse.
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Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 41. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that 'Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of up to three months without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport'. 914 23 MJ 6 (2016) 31 Th e Commission refi ned the scope of its action to focus on conditions regulating the payment of child benefi t and child tax credit, and to challenge the compatibility with EU equal treatment obligations of the requirement in national rules that a person claiming these benefi ts had to satisfy a right to reside test. Regulation 883/2004 establishes a 'habitual residence' test for the payment of social security benefi ts; through criteria developed further in legislation and in case law, this is a factual 'centre of interests' test, the purpose of which is to determine the Member State of responsibility in the complicated mission of social security coordination. 32 Additionally, Article 4 of the Regulation provides that '[u]nless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefi ts and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof'. Th e Commission argued that by requiring a right to reside -lawful residence -for persons claiming child benefi t and child tax credit, UK rules add a condition not provided for in Regulation 883/2004. In its view, the determination of habitual residence 'cannot be infl uenced by the provisions of 34 Th e legal context of this case diff ers from the case law on legal residence that preceded it in one signifi cant respect. In Brey, Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto, the benefi ts in question were classifi ed as special non-contributory benefi ts. Th e Court recognized that these benefi ts were provided for in Regulation 883/2004 but it super-imposed its defi nition of social assistance for the purposes of Directive 2004/38 over that legal framework. However, in Commission v. UK, as confi rmed by the Court, the two benefi ts in question 'have the objective of helping to cover family expenses and are funded not from recipients' contributions but from compulsory taxation'; according to established case law, 'benefi ts which are granted automatically to families that meet certain objective criteria relating in particular to their size, income and capital resources, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, and which are intended to meet family expenses must be regarded as social security benefi ts' 35 -that is, they are not also classifi able as social assistance benefi ts in the understanding of that term derived from Brey and the line of cases that followed it. In fact, the families in Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto all received comparable child benefi ts in Germany and this was not contested in any of the three cases by the competent national authorities.
Addressing the fi rst part of the Commission's argument, the Court disagreed that Regulation 883/2004 must be the sole source of conditions determining eligibility for social security benefi ts. Th e Court accepted that the Regulation is intended not only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative systems to a given situation and the complications which may ensue, but also to ensure that persons covered by that regulation are not left without social security cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them. 36 However, it also found that the relevant provision of the Regulation 'is not intended to lay down the conditions creating the right to social security benefi ts', meaning that '[i]t is in principle for the legislation of each Member State to lay down those conditions'. 37 Since the Regulation is all about the coordination of national social security schemes, the Court inferred that the measure 'thus allows diff erent schemes to continue to exist, creating diff erent claims on diff erent institutions against which the claimant possesses pay certain family allowances to the persons concerned, despite the fact that the latter live in a Member State and have dependent children'. Th e facts in Dano provide a useful illustration of when that might be the case. 38 Without any discussion of the fact that the benefi ts at issue are not social assistance benefi ts, 39 the Court then cited Brey and Dano to conclude that 'there is nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefi ts to Union citizens who are not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfi l the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State'. 40 However, inserting the Directive's tiers of citizenship, which are premised on degree of economic activity undertaken (or not), into the Regulation has been strongly criticized. 41 Using the Directive to override the scope of the Regulation in this way also calls into question the reasoning applied in cases such as Teixeira, which are premised precisely on a separation between the personal scope (Directive) and material scope (Regulation 492/2011) of claims about entitlement to benefi ts. 42 And it raises questions about how much further the reach of the Directive might penetrate into other dimensions of material scopeincluding claims made by those working or self-employed in a host state, something that will be returned to below (Section 3.B.).
Meanwhile, in Commission v. UK, the Court disagreed with the Commission's argument that the right to reside test distorted the Regulation's habitual residence test; it is instead 'a substantive condition which economically inactive persons must meet in order to be eligible for the social benefi ts at issue'. 43 However, that fi nding does bridge to the Commission's alternative argument, since the Court accepted that 'a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to aff ect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of 38 Ibid., para. 67.
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Compare Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 64. Th is question is returned to in more detail below. 917 the host state and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage'. 44 Turning then to the question of justifi cation, the Commission had accepted that 'a Member State may wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between the person claiming the benefi t and the competent Member State' -however, for social security benefi ts, it restated that 'it is Regulation 883/2004 itself which establishes the means of testing whether such a genuine link exists (in this particular case, by applying the habitual residence criterion), and the Member States may make no changes to its provisions and add no supplementary conditions'. 45 But the Court's position on justifi cation follows on from its leniency on that very question, concluding that the need to protect the fi nances of the host Member State justifi es in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefi t is granted in particular to persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State. 46 Finally, in its evaluation of the proportionality of the condition, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that verifi cation of lawful residence invokes Article 14(2) of the Directive, which provides: '[i]n specifi c cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her family members satisfi es the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if these conditions are fulfi lled. Th is verifi cation shall not be carried out systematically'. Th e Court was satisfi ed that UK procedures complied with these criteria, fi nding that the checking of compliance with the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38 for existence of a right of residence is not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the requirements of Article 14(2) of the directive. It is only in the event of doubt that the United Kingdom authorities eff ect the verifi cation necessary to determine whether the claimant satisfi es the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38, in particular those set out in Article 7, and, therefore, whether he has a right to reside lawfully in United Kingdom territory, for the purposes of the directive. 47 §3. COMMENT Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK entrench the basic Dano position on equal treatment for EU citizens: their right not to be discriminated against in a host state 44 Ibid., para. 77, citing Case C-73/08 Bressol, EU:C:2010:181, para. 41. Th e question of whether the discrimination at issue was direct or indirect is considered further below. is connected to Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, which is conditioned by a right to reside in that state, which is in turn conditioned by other relevant provisions of the Directive. It therefore seems far less likely that an applicant residing lawfully in a host state solely under national law (Martínez Sala) or another stream of EU law (Teixeira) could succeed -for ' [t] he palette of [Directive-compliant] situations is clearly more restrained than that of situations coming "within the scope of application of the Treaties" which trigger the application of Article 18 TFEU'. 48 Th e conditions established in the Directive are thus conferred with legal but also normative eminence in citizenship law, the implications of which will now be examined in more detail. Th e discussion fi rst looks in more detail at how the fundamental free movement premises of discrimination, justifi cation and proportionality played out in the recent case law. Th e relationship between the Directive and other sources of EU law -both primary and secondary -is then considered.
A. LAWFUL RESIDENCE, EQUAL TREATMENT AND DIRECTIVE
2004/38
1. Th e nature of the discrimination 919
Th e Commission referenced the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bressol to support this part of its claim. In that case, the Advocate General raised for debate the sometimes obscure dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination -drawing from case law on sex discrimination, she considered not just criteria explicitly framed as such, but also 'necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from sex'. 52 By analogy, 'discrimination can be considered to be direct where the diff erence in treatment is based on a criterion which is either explicitly that of nationality or necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from nationality'. 53 Th e right to reside condition contested in Commission v. UK clearly meets that test 'because UK nationals resident in the United Kingdom automatically fulfi l it'. 54 O'Brien presents the reality here very clearly:
UK nationals do not 'more easily satisfy' the test; they do not 'more oft en than not' satisfy the test -they always and automatically satisfy the test and so are excused from meeting the condition. Only EU nationals must provide evidence of a right to reside. Only EU nationals can be excluded from entitlement due to economic inactivity. 55 However, despite having emphasized the need to distinguish the right to reside condition in the national rules from the habitual residence criterion in Regulation 883/2004, the Court in fact blended the two once again in its reasoning on this point, fi nding that the UK rules generate unequal treatment between UK nationals and nationals of other states since 'such a residence condition is more easily satisfi ed by United Kingdom nationals, who more oft en than not are habitually resident in the United Kingdom, than by nationals of other Member States, whose residence, by contrast, is generally in a Member State other than the United Kingdom'. 56 Advocate General Cruz Villalón articulated the crux of the dilemma when he noted that 'diff erence in treatment as regards the right of residence is inherent in the system and, to a certain extent, inevitable: by defi nition, a national of a Member State cannot be denied a right of residence in that State'. 57 Th e 'system' that can be inferred here is that established by Directive 2004/38; since the Advocate General went on to reference the unequal treatment that Article 24(2) of this measure allows for in the context of social assistance. But, EU free movement law still places (legal) value on distinguishing between diff erent kinds of unequal treatment. In Bressol, Advocate General Sharpston argued in essence that some rules, in their eff ects, are as close to direct discrimination as you can get without labelling it as such explicitly. In that case and in Commission v. UK, the Court declined to transpose to free movement law the more nuanced template applied in sex discrimination law, which allows for this kind of complexity to be recognized. By citing its judgment, and not the Opinion, in Bressol, the Court opted, without further discussion, for the less severe outcome -less severe in the sense that the main legal consequence that fl ows from classifi cation as indirect discrimination concerns the openended range of public interests that a state can then seek to defend.
Justifi cation and proportionality
In the judgment in Commission v. UK -and since the defendant state was not confi ned to the limited Treaty grounds on which direct discrimination might be forgiven -the Court ruled that the need to protect the fi nances of the host Member State justifi es in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefi t is granted in particular to persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State. 58 Th e line of case law that the Court then cited in support of this point shows the lowkey yet profoundly signifi cant evolution of how the public fi nance defence has been handled in free movement law. Th is development can be traced through the Court's own references. First, concern for the protection of public fi nances was acknowledged but balanced against -and presented overall as -a citizen-centred argument in Grzelczyk that 'benefi ciaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on the public fi nances of the host Member State. Directive 93/96 (…) thus accepts a certain degree of fi nancial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the diffi culties which a benefi ciary of the right of residence encounters are temporary'. 59 However, subsequently, we can observe both a more generalized version of that principle in Bidar and also a shift in the expression of it more accommodating of the interests of the state ('although the Member States must, in the organisation and application of their social assistance systems, show a certain degree of fi nancial solidarity with nationals of other Member States (…) it is permissible for a Member State to ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State'). 60 Now, the public fi nance defence features centrally in the defi nition of social 921 assistance per se in Brey 61 and Dano 62 -'to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources suffi cient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public fi nances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State'. 63 In Alimanovic, the Court reiterated the related point from Dano that it is a stated objective of Directive 2004/38 to '[prevent] Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State'. 64 It is widely observed that this approach subdues other objectives also plainly articulated in the preamble 65 as well as recalibrating, more generally, the diminution of solidarity borders that was either (depending on your view of the progress of integration) refl ected or more consciously attempted by the Court in Grzelczyk. 66 Th e line between apparently forbidden justifi cation grounds based on purely economic reasons, on the one hand, and permitted justifi cation grounds expressed in the language of public fi nance yet protecting broader aims and activities, on the other, is a diffi cult one to draw. 67 However, in the reactions to date to Alimanovic and Commission v. UK, the more practical dimension of demonstrating the problem for public fi nances has attracted particular criticism. Two related issues stand out in this context -the soft ness of proportionality scrutiny that results from the confi rmed move to systemic impact rather than individual circumstances assessment; and the prevalence of presumptions over proof.
As mentioned above, we saw that the Court expressly ruled out in Alimanovic the need for an assessment of the individual burden placed on the defendant state's welfare system. Advocate General Wathelet had presented an alternative argument. While acknowledging that the 'loss of the status of worker seems to be an appropriate, albeit restrictive, transposition of Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38', he then considered that 'its automatic consequences for entitlement to subsistence benefi ts under SGB II seem 61 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 61.
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Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 63. 922 23 MJ 6 (2016) to go beyond the general system established by that directive'. 68 On that basis, and in a 'remarkable eff ort to fi t the reasoning in Dano with the fi ndings in judgments predating it', 69 he suggested that it is important that the competent authorities of the host Member State, when examining the application of a Union citizen, economically inactive and in a situation like that of Ms Alimanovic and her daughter Sonita, take into account, inter alia, not only the amount and regularity of the income received by the citizen of the Union, but also the period during which the benefi t applied for is likely to be granted to them. 70 He then drew from the Court's case law on how a real link with the host state might be demonstrated, which 'ought to prevent automatic exclusion from those benefi ts'. 71 In particular, drawing from the judgment in Prete, he recalled that demonstrating a real link to the labour market also includes personal factors, such as family circumstances, as well as labour market criteria, such as '[h]aving worked in the past, or even the fact of having found a new job aft er applying for the grant of social assistance'. 72 However, the Court provided three reasons for its decision to the contrary. First, since the Directive establishes a 'gradual system' concerning retention of the status of worker, that measure 'itself takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity'. 73 However, that statement just makes no sense -a 'gradual system' established by legislation cannot take into consideration 'various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance'. Neither does it take into account 'the duration of the exercise of any economic activity' in each individual situation. It establishes instead a general -and not an individual -framework, one that is based on fi xed time-points rather than more fl exible qualitative criteria. Th e genuine confusion for national authorities caused by these kinds of guidelines does have to be acknowledged as a concern when more qualitative criteria are used, and this is returned to under the second point below. But the 'gradual system' put in place by the Directive cannot explain the soft er guidance issued in consideration of the Breys -who 68 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 103, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 77 (emphasis added). all three children were born [in the host State]; the family had lived there in the past for a considerable amount of time; they returned in 2010 apparently with the intention to settle; Ms Alimanovic and her daughter had already joined the workforce in Germany, which showed that they were willing and capable of entering into an employment relationship. Such factors were not and could not be taken into account by the Directive, which focuses on 'the duration of the exercise of any economic activity '. 74 If it is time to move on from the long-established approach 75 to proportionality in citizenship law -one that examines not just the appropriateness and necessity of the legal provision, but of its impact when applied in individual cases -, then suggesting that the same task is or even could be performed by a legislative measure adds nothing useful to that debate.
Second, the Court also emphasised in Alimanovic that the clarity off ered by following the criteria set down in both the relevant national rules and Article 7(3)(c) of the Directive 'guarantee[s] a signifi cant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context of the award of social assistance by way of basic provision, while complying with the principle of proportionality'. 76 As indicated just above, this rationale is far more convincing, having particular regard to the implementation of rights challenge facing national authorities. Nevertheless, a fi rst quality of law problem, concerning the case law produced, is that, as also indicated above, the Court did not deal directly with its own previous case law -case law that had consistently pushed the individual assessment approach notwithstanding its practical weaknesses. Something changed aft er Brey; but that change has not been explained. A related risk is that, as we saw also in the discussion on direct/indirect discrimination, apparently simpler solutions cover rather than deal with the fact that the philosophy and the practice of free movement have become increasingly complicated. For example, while plainly acknowledging the diffi culties and problems that fuzzier individual assessment tests do provoke, Iliopoulou-Penot equally cautions that aiming to reduce the problem through the turn that began in Dano but became much more overt in Alimanovic 'might leave a dangerous imprint on the proper functioning of a general principle, which until now seemed inherent in the judicial application of norms of constitutional status'. 77 However, it must also be pointed out that quality of law expectations apply to the draft ing of the Directive too; and to reviewing it when some problematic ambiguities, gaps and problems are demonstrated very plainly through recurring case law instances. Th ird, the Court acknowledged that the assistance awarded to a single applicant can scarcely be described as an 'unreasonable burden' for a Member State, within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38. However, while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to it would be bound to do so. 78 On this point, we see a dangerous victory for presumption -'all the individual claims which would be submitted to it' -in contrast to the point made in Brey that in order to ascertain more precisely the extent of the burden which that grant would place on the national social assistance system, it may be relevant, as the Commission argued at the hearing, to determine the proportion of the benefi ciaries of that benefi t who are Union citizens in receipt of a retirement pension in another Member State. 79 Th e problem with presumption is that it feeds right into the tendency towards exaggeration already too dominant in debates about free movement; in Garcia-Nieto, even Advocate General Wathelet remarked that 'granting entitlement to social assistance to Union citizens who are not required to have suffi cient means of subsistence could result in relocation en masse liable to create an unreasonable burden on national social security systems'. 80 In contrast, O'Brien rightly calls for both the procedures and standards of proof evident more generally in free movement law to (continue to) play a part in citizenship case law too: 'while politically potent, the mere mention of public fi nances on its own should not close down all argument. Some actual (not abstract) threat to public fi nances ought to be shown, in light of the evidence that fears of EU national benefi t tourists are misplaced'. 81 Here, Iliopoulou-Penot links the more problematic 'indulgence' of the Court as regards 'the "cumulative eff ect" assertion in Alimanovic' 82 to the cryptic Commission declaration that it had been provided with 'information' showing that 'the type of exceptional situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists in the United Kingdom today' with respect to the so-called emergency brake proposed as a pre-referendum concession, which will be returned to below (Section 3.B.2.). 83 78 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 62.
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Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 78 (emphasis added).
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Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 71. 
925
Th e Court's judgment in Commission v. UK also illustrates another side of soft ened proportionality review. It can be recalled that the Court focused not on the proportionality of the right to reside condition per se but on how it was applied. 84 From that perspective, it in turn placed considerable emphasis on the fact that verifi cation of lawful residence was compliant in its view with Article 14(2) of the Directive; in particular, it was practised '[i]n specifi c cases, where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his family members satisfy the conditions' for lawful residence established by the Directive. 85 Th e Court continued that data provided by a person claiming child benefi t or child tax credit would reveal whether or not there is a right to reside in the United Kingdom, those data being checked subsequently by the authorities responsible for granting the benefi t concerned. It is only in specifi c cases that claimants are required to prove that they in fact enjoy a right to reside lawfully in United Kingdom territory, as declared by them in the claim form. 86 Th e Court therefore concluded that checking for compliance with lawful residence was 'not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the requirements of Article 14(2) of the directive '. 87 Dismantling that analysis as 'nonsense', Cousins responds: 'it is clear that there is systematic verifi cation of the right to reside in every case -it is only the degree of verifi cation which varies. Unsurprisingly, the UK authorities do not further verify a right to reside where it is clear that a claimant has such a right'. 88 O'Brien further criticizes the reversal of the burden of proof eff ected by the judgment. 89 Th e Court recalled that 'the Commission (…) has the task of proving the existence of the alleged infringement and of providing the Court with the evidence necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out' -but continued that the Commission had 'not provided evidence or arguments showing that such checking does not satisfy the conditions of proportionality, that it is not appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of protecting public fi nances or that it goes beyond what is necessary to attain that Europe (2016) , http://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-renegotiation-and-the-burying-of-the-balance-ofcompetencies-review/.
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For criticism of this point of confl ation, see e.g. C. O'Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016) , forthcoming: 'It is the condition, not the checks, that is the main problem, and it is the condition that must be justifi ed once it has been shown to be discriminatory. Th e checks are a separate, though important issue'. 2016) objective'. 90 Here, the Court confl ates proof of infringement with substantiation of defence. Th is and the morphing of justifi cation and proportionality requirements more generally expose a series of quality of law problems in a substantive sense.
A fi nal question concerns the consequences that might arise if it is found that a person claiming social benefi ts does not have a right to reside in the host state. None of the relevant public authorities had brought the disputes to the threshold of deportation in Dano or its three successor cases to date. Aft er Dano, this practice raised questions about the responsibilities of states for citizens who became 'tolerated' in their territories but not supported there as a result. 91 In Commission v. UK, Advocate General Cruz Villalón indicated quite clearly the direction in which he felt such responsibility lies:
any fi nding by the national authorities that that Union citizen does not have a right of residence under that directive because he does not fulfi l the requirements set out therein, regardless of whether this would carry an expulsion measure and despite the fact that it is merely declaratory, is 'a decision [restricting] free movement of Union citizens' within the meaning of Article 15(1) of that directive, which, as laid down in that provision, has the eff ect of activating the guarantees provided for in Articles 30 and 31 thereof. 92 If fi ndings on lawful residence are required to be formalized in all cases in this way, how many -in reality -would not proceed to the next step of an expulsion measure? Aft er all, if the administrative machinery of the state is already engaged, continuing down the trajectory does not seem as burdensome as having stopped at refusing the benefi t in the fi rst place. Perhaps then we are entering a phase of 'tolerance no more', which may be a fairer refl ection and consequence of how citizenship law has developed -but maybe it is also fair to say that it does not seem very much like citizenship as a result.
B. DIRECTIVE 2004/38 AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLES 18, 21 AND 45 TFEU
Th e super-norm status conferred on Directive 2004/38 -and especially on the conditions set down in Article 7(1)(b), given that most national rules challenged to date restricted entitlement to social assistance and/or social benefi ts concern persons who are not engaged in work or self-employed -also raises tricky questions about the relationship between the rights conferred on citizens by Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and of the diff erent legislative measures adopted to give eff ect to these (diff erent?) sets of primary rights. 927 view on specifi c expression; the consequences of hybrid status; and a newer sense of specifi c expression superseded. First, the original view on specifi c expression refers to the idea that freedom of movement for workers in Article 45 TFEU was deemed to be a specifi c expression of the right to reside and move freely conferred on citizens more generally by Article 21 TFEU. Th e principal consequence was that situations that fell within the scope of Article 45 were to be examined against that provision in the fi rst instance, with consideration of Article 21 TFEU only being necessary if the case could not be resolved on that basis. 93 Th is view suggested that Article 21 TFEU was a residual provision, called into being only when the economic freedoms were not otherwise triggered. However, second, in the case law on benefi ts payable to jobseekers, the Court fused the Treaty provisions together to construct 'the hybrid system described in Collins', 94 that is [i] n view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the caselaw of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 4[5](2) [TFEU] -which expresses the fundamental principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article [18 TFEU] -a benefi t of a fi nancial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State. 95 Here, in contrast to the residual approach, Article 21 TFEU is blended with Article 45 TFEU; freedom of movement of workers is infused with a legal added value extracted from free movement as a citizenship right, to enhance the scope of equal treatment. Importantly, the solution developed in Collins could not have been achieved by using either provision alone.
But it is arguable that, third, post-Dano, the limitations signalled in Article 21 TFEU -which are laid down not just in the Treaties but also 'by measures adopted to give them eff ect' -now supersede other specifi c expressions of free movement rights. In what follows, the implications of this shift are fi rst demonstrated through discussion of the interplay of secondary legislation as concerns the nature of the benefi t at issue in recent case law. Th e implications of that reasoning for the rights of jobseekers and for the rights of migrant workers are then considered. 1. Th e nature of the benefi t Th e Court did have a classifi cation question in Alimanovic, since it needed to determine what, more precisely, constituted a benefi t intended to facilitate access to employment in a host state's labour market. In his Opinion, it seems clear that Advocate General RuizJarabo Colomer envisaged an inclusive interpretation: the objective of the assistance must be analysed according to its results rather than according to the formal structure of the benefi t (…) there may be 'social assistance' measures, as contemplated in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38, which promote integration into the labour market. In those circumstances, Collins demands that Article [45 TFEU] be applied and that social assistance be granted to persons seeking employment within the territory of the Union. 96 Th e Court explicitly referred to his analysis in its judgment, confi rming that 'the objective of the benefi t must be analysed according to its results and not according to its formal structure'. 97 It noted too that national authorities should 'not only (…) establish the existence of a real link with the labour market, but also to assess the constituent elements of that benefi t, in particular its purposes and the conditions subject to which it is granted'. 98 At the level of fact, fi nancial assistance towards basic provision or housing has the 'result' of facilitating access to the labour market. Of course it does. In Alimanovic, Adovcate General Wathelet acknowledged the 'possibly mixed nature of the benefi t on the classifi cation of the measure (that is to say, the case in which the benefi t in question possesses both features relating to social assistance and features relating to integration into the labour market)'. 99 However, we saw above that the Court ultimately followed his 'predominant function' method, which results in a more restrictive outcome when coupled with the Brey functional defi nition of social assistance. 100 Th e nature of the benefi t question in Alimanovic thus involved a choice at the level of interpretation of concepts. What complicated the picture much further in Commission v. UK concerns the codifi cation of choices in secondary legislation. As noted above, one problem links back to how the Alimanovic/Garcia-Nieto reasoning on social assistance benefi ts was transposed to social security benefi ts without comment or explanation. 101 To compound that problem, questions about determining the nature of the benefi t at issue exposed an ambiguity about how diff erent pieces of secondary legislation work together.
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Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 57 (emphasis in original). 
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In his Opinion, Advocate General Cruz Villalón, having acknowledged that 'the purpose of Regulation 883/2004 is to coordinate Member States' social security systems in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons may be exercised eff ectively' went on to state that the Regulation lays down a series of common principles which the social security legislation of all the Member States must observe and which, together with the system of confl ict of laws rules it contains, ensure that persons exercising their right to free movement and residence within the Union will not be adversely treated by the various national systems because they have exercised that right. One of those common principles is the principle of equal treatment under Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 which, for the specifi c area of social security, embodies the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality which is applicable to all EU law under Article 18 TFEU. 102 He also acknowledged that 'whilst Directive 2004/38 takes account of the need to have recourse to social assistance benefi ts in the context of the lawfulness of residence, it is silent regarding social security benefi ts such as those at issue in this case'. 103 Th at part of the analysis accorded with the submissions of the Commission.
However, the turn of argument then pursued changed the resolution of the dispute completely, and the reasoning applied could have implications far beyond the specifi cs of this case. Th e steps in the legal argument are critical. Th e Advocate General fi rst stated that Article 18(1) TFEU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality '[w] ithin the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein'; next, he pointed to the 'measures adopted to give them eff ect' part of Article 21(1). For the avoidance of any doubt, he referred also to the 'limited nature' of the freedom to move and reside as a Charter right, since, '[i]n accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the conditions and within the limits defi ned by the Treaties'. 104 From a general starting point that 'the EU legal order could hardly consist of a multiplicity of entirely separate compartments', special emphasis was then placed on the fact that Directive 2004/38 had been adopted '[w]ith a view to remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to the right of free movement and residence and facilitating the exercise of this right'. 105 Extrapolating a claim to legal hierarchy for the Directive on that basis, he concluded: Th e idea of the Directive's limitations and conditions setting preconditions -over and above any other legislative provisions connected to free movement -is a critical interpretative step. Th e prohibition on discrimination expressed in Article 4 of the Regulation is sidelined as the expression of a 'common principle' that is 'applicable to all EU law under Article 18 TFEU'. Directive 2004/38 is confi rmed all the more as the beginning and end of citizenship rights -their fl oor and their ceiling, as Spaventa puts it. 107 Th en noting variable references to 'social benefi ts' and 'social assistance' in Brey, Dano and Alimanovic, 108 the Advocate General concluded that 'there is nothing in those judgments to indicate that such fi ndings apply exclusively to the social assistance benefi ts or the special non-contributory cash benefi ts with which those cases were concerned and not to other social benefi ts'. 109 We saw above that the Court's treatment of these questions was far briefer but also apparently diff erent. It emphasized more the coordination objective of the Regulation than the consolidation objective of the Directive. But the endpoint was the same: 'there is nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefi ts to Union citizens who are not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfi l the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State'. 110 Th is interpretation diminishes the Regulation at one level, since it enabled the strapping on of a lawful residence test from the Directive to the habitual residence test in the Regulation -even if the Court treated the two regulatory spaces as simply diff erent. However, in contrast to the precondition reasoning applied by the Advocate General, the Court did not displace the prohibition on discrimination captured by Article 4 of the Regulation.
Instead, the Court acknowledged an indirectly restrictive breach of it. But here, it did accept the Directive's expression of lawful residence conditions as a justifi able discriminatory limit on the Regulation's operation, leading O'Brien to note the irony that claimants 'might only gain protection from discrimination if they have already (2) of that directive contains a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination'. 112 However, that diff erent interpretative approaches were applied to arrive at the same endpoint may yet have considerable implications, as restrictions on equal treatment move further into the formerly sacred space of economic activity.
Implications for the free movement of workers
Th e circumstances in Alimanovic represented a diffi cult middle ground between citizens who are not, or are not yet, economically active and citizens who meet the defi nition of worker under EU law, since the claimants had undertaken economic activity in the host state but not of suffi cient duration to comply with the criteria laid down in Directive 2004/28 for retention of worker status. 113 However, that defi nition is, more generally, acknowledged to set a low threshold of contribution to the host state in contrast to the high threshold of equal treatment then triggered. It is therefore surprising that the Court did not consider whether Ms Alimanovic or her eldest daughter might have rights under Article 45 TFEU directly. 114 It had determined in Saint Prix that the criteria listed in Article 7(3) for the retention of worker status are not exhaustive, enabling it to secure continuity of worker status for a woman who stopped work for pregnancy and childbirth. 115 While greater consistency of approach to the role of primary rights is needed, it was perhaps easier for the Court to extract protection directly from Article 45 TFEU for a criterion not contemplated at all by the Directive than for the criteria that are included there for former workers. It is perhaps also worth considering the sting in the Saint Prix judgment tail: where a former worker has been employed in a host State for more than one year, entitlement to social assistance on the premise of equal treatment with nationals of that state seems to be open-ended; but in Saint Prix, the Court attached a condition about returning to work 'within a reasonable period '. 116 Perhaps that dimension of Article 45 TFEU could yet infl uence the interpretation of Article 7(3) of the Directive as well. Case C-507/12 Saint Prix, EU:C:2014 EU:C: :2007 Ibid., para. 41. 932 23 MJ 6 (2016) To date, equal treatment for migrant workers as regards entitlement to social benefi ts rests on Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011, which provides very plainly that a worker from another state 'shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers'. Additionally, the Court has interpreted 'social and tax advantages' very broadly: 'in view of the equality of treatment which the provision seeks to achieve, the substantive area of application must be delineated so as to include all social and tax advantages, whether or not attached to the contract of employment'. 117 Th e Court also confi rmed that so long as its threshold defi nition of work was reached, the worker was then entitled to social assistance on the same basis as nationals of the host state. 118 Jobseekers were originally deemed not to come within the scope of Article 7(2) of the Regulation. 119 However, despite the 'objective diff erence' between workers and those seeking work, 120 we saw that Collins created a 'hybrid system' whereby, through the coupling of Articles 21 and 45 TFEU: '[t]he interpretation of the scope of the principle of equal treatment in relation to access to employment must refl ect this development, as compared with the interpretation followed in Lebon'. 121 Moreover, the Court went on to refer to the jobseekers allowance at issue in Collins as a social advantage with reference to Article 7(2) of the Regulation. 122 But if the recent case law considered in this comment has moved us beyond original specifi c expression and hybrid analyses of the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, towards a superseding of Treaty rights and also of conditions expressed in legislation other than Directive 2004/38, could this have implications for citizens who are working or self-employed in a host state?
In the context of examining economic justifi cations for free movement restrictions, Spaventa outlines the basic logic that has long protected equal treatment for migrant workers:
EU economic migrants might draw on host State welfare provision, but they also pay into it through general and ad hoc contribution. It is for this reason that economic justifi cations cannot be relied upon in the internal market: protectionism is to be eradicated, not encouraged. 123 117 Case 32/75 Cristini, EU:C:1975:120, para. 12-13. 118 Case 139/85 Kempf, EU:C:1986:223, para. 14: 'a person in eff ective and genuine part-time employment cannot be excluded from their sphere of application merely because the remuneration he derives from it is below the level of the minimum means of subsistence and he seeks to supplement it by other lawful means of subsistence.
[I]t is irrelevant whether those supplementary means of subsistence are derived from property or from the employment of a member of his family (…) or whether (…) they are obtained from fi nancial assistance drawn from the public funds of the Member State in which he resides'. 
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She also expresses the converse implication: that the conditions requiring citizens not pursuing economic activity to be self-suffi cient in order to reside lawfully in the host state are therefore legitimate, as are the economic considerations underpinning them. 124 Th us, it is not that workers do not have to meet the condition of lawful residence in the host State at all; but that working there satisfi es it because Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive does not place any requirement of self-suffi ciency on workers. In reality though, the Court's approach to economic justifi cations has, as acknowledged by Spaventa, become far more fragile. As Davies explains, [t] he assumption that those in employment are self-suffi cient is not refl ected in many European societies, where signifi cant parts of the labour force may rely on support varying from subsidized housing and medical care to tax breaks and income top-ups. 125 Th e Court has itself moved towards a more explicit articulation of the qualitative as well as the functional integration link that work provides to the host state in the context of equal treatment claims. In this trend, Giubboni identifi es seeds of 'an interpretative reorientation, or detour' that could, if consolidated further, 'undermine (…) the unconditional right for migrant workers to have access to all the social benefi ts guaranteed by the host country'. 126 Two examples allow us to test how and to what extent recent case law might reach into equal treatment for migrant workers: fi rst, the limitation in Article 24(2) of the Directive that no social assistance is payable during the fi rst three months of residence; and second, the phased entitlement to in-work benefi ts proposed as part of the political settlement for UK membership of the EU negotiated in February 2016.
On the fi rst example, there is a presumption in the case law that the exclusion of entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence does not apply to workers. In Garcia-Nieto, the Court stated that 'it follows from the express wording of [Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38] that the host Member State may refuse to grant persons other than workers, self-employed persons or those who retain that status any social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence'. 127 But there is no such 'express wording' in that provision. In accordance with Article 24(1) of the Directive, workers do reside lawfully in a host state 'on the basis of this Directive' simply because they are workers; that does not explain why the clear and unconditional derogation from equal treatment in Article 24(2) of the Directive -that 'the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence' -should not then apply to them. 934 23 MJ 6 (2016) Turning to the second example, it was noted earlier that the February 2016 Conclusions included a proposed amendment to Regulation 492/2011 in the form of an emergency brake, outlined as an alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of infl ow of workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time (…). A Member State (…) would notify the Commission and the Council that such an exceptional situation exists on a scale that aff ects essential aspects of its social security system, including the primary purpose of its in-work benefi ts system, or which leads to diffi culties which are serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its public services. On a proposal from the Commission aft er having examined the notifi cation and the reasons stated therein, the Council could authorise the Member State concerned to restrict access to non-contributory in-work benefi ts to the extent necessary. Th e Council would authorise that Member State to limit the access of newly arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefi ts for a total period of up to four years from the commencement of employment. Th e limitation should be graduated, from an initial complete exclusion but gradually increasing access to such benefi ts to take account of the growing connection of the worker with the labour market of the host Member State. 128 Had this Decision come into eff ect, and the proposed amendment to Regulation 492/2011 proceeded in the directly discriminatory language in which it was framed ('EU workers'), then noting the Court's reluctance to deal with public interest justifi cation and direct discrimination in Commission v. UK, the revised legislation was very unlikely to have survived a legal challenge. However, had the amendments been draft ed more neutrally (that is, based on residence), the nature of the legal problem changes. How, in that case, would the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and between Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 492/2011, be managed?
Noting the clear transposition of economic justifi cation to situations involving economic activity in the text of the Decision, refusal to listen to that public interest defence would have been one striking outcome. But observing how the public fi nance narrative has intensifi ed towards state interests over time, as traced above, makes that unlikely. Th is brings us back to the distinction between the ascendancy conferred on Directive 2004/38 in recent case law, on the one hand, and how it was conferred, on the other. Th e originally protective status that the specifi c expression and hybrid interpretations wrapped around Article 45 TFEU (and Regulation 492/2011 in consequence) no longer seem suffi ciently sturdy to withstand the kind of system envisaged by the 2016 Decision. But how far could the superseding of free movement of workers by the Directive actually be taken?
At the very least, it seems strange that the Decision did not explicitly require an amendment of Article 24(2) of the Directive at least, if not some alteration of Article 7(1)(a) also. Assuming that the EU legislature did in fact intend to amend Article 24(2), would 128 See footnote 86 above.
'What I Tell You Th ree Times is True' 23 MJ 6 (2016) 935 that be the end of the matter? Here is where the diff ering approaches of the Advocate General and Court in Commission v. UK could make a critical legal diff erence. If the logic of the Opinion were followed, then Directive 2004/38 would simply displace Articles 18 and 45 TFEU as a more specifi c expression of equal treatment. An appropriate amendment to the Directive's text would then be the end of the matter, subject to checks on proportionality -and even then, not entirely rigorous checks if the weak requirements on evidence and proof evident in Commission v. UK were followed.
However, in that case, the Court admitted consideration of the right to reside test in the fi rst place since the Regulation was 'not intended to lay down the conditions creating the right to social security benefi ts'. 129 Regulation 492/2011 is patently intended to lay down the conditions for equal treatment of workers. Does that change its relationship to Directive 2004/38, restoring the more conventional 'specifi c expression' route for examining any proposed amendments of the Regulation, that is, against Articles 18 and TFEU directly? But opening up the link between equal treatment and economic activity would still have tested both the limits of and philosophy underpinning what, post Dano, the Court has told us three more times is true -to claim equal treatment rights, lawful residence needs to be established only in accordance with what Directive 2004/38 says that lawful residence means. If some form of self-suffi ciency requirement for workers and self-employed persons were included in Article 7 of that measure, then it could displace Article 7 of Regulation 492/2011.
Events have since overtaken the February 2016 Decision. But the problems -and the pressures -remain. Let us not forget that the UK initiating a discussion about limiting the free movement of workers is not really the key point; rather, it is that 27 other Member States wanted -or, at least, were ready -to do it. §4. CONCLUSION Th e decisions in Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK do create a consistent line of jurisprudence with Dano, confi rming the main premises of that judgment and also expanding them through application in diff erent contexts. But then, the weaknesses of Dano from a quality of law perspective are compounded in consequence too. Commentary continues to question more broadly what kind of citizenship law is being shaped as a result. 130 Th is comment does not seek to argue that a connection between lawful residence and equal treatment is per se unacceptable. But how that connection has been developed and applied does matter. In that respect, critiques of the part played 936 23 MJ 6 (2016) by the Court persist. But even where the restrictive case law on lawful residence and social benefi ts is appreciated in the fraught context of crisis-ridden welfare politics, 131 what remains more diffi cult to condone is the extent of the distortion of quality of law -of legal methodology and of systemic coherence -that has been practised to reach the case law outcomes. 132 Quality of case law is also intrinsically tied to quality of the legislation that underpins it: Davies is right that the legislative responsibility to regulate free movement well is not being fulfi lled. 133 How mobility is experienced has long outgrown the basic constructs developed for life at a very diff erent time and in a very diff erent world. Th e appealing simplicity of the framework of equal treatment law undoubtedly contributed to its rooting in the legal and political systems of Member States. But how we exercise free movement and how we defi ne discrimination have changed entirely since the European Economic Community was fi rst conceived. People lead more complicated cross-border lives, while the legal components of equal treatment and free movement have barely changed. Th e minimalist framework of free movement law compresses legal nuances, mashes distinct concerns together, and generates blunt legal solutions to very diff erent practical problems. Th e law and legal institutions have become too remote from the facts on the ground. And the inherent connections between equal treatment in free movement and the 'European project' then become toxic, disaff ection with the former inevitably bleeding into the latter.
In the 2016 negotiations, the UK Government presented the objective of 'renegotiating' free movement from a destructive starting point that sought the dismantling of rights in order to reduce them, and with no regard to the wider system of EU law or its role in grounding the Union. By contrast, let us invert the premises of the UK challenge into a constructive rethinking of equal treatment and free movement law -not to reduce rights, but to strengthen them. For now, recent case law on lawful residence exhibits the surprising extent to which what we might consider to be basic EU law -how legislative measures interact with each other, for example -is far less worked out than thought it was, in EU citizenship at least. 
